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Abstract 
 
In this article we examine how startup businesses finance their operations over time. We 
employ the Latent growth modeling technique to test the financial growth cycle theory developed 
by Berger and Udell (1998). The data used in this study is the Kauffman Firm Survey, the largest 
longitudinal data set comprised of a random sample of U.S. startups launched in 2004 and surveyed 
annually through 2011. Consistent with the predictions of financial growth cycle theory, in the 
startup stage, entrepreneurs rely on initial insider capital sources such as personal savings, 
financing offered by friends and family, quasi-equity, and personal debt. Over time, as businesses 
become less opaque, the proportion of business debt and trade credit financing in total capital 
injection volume increases significantly. Businesses with high R&D activity and those that possess 
intellectual property rights finance their operations predominantly with equity - particularly 
external equity raised from angels and venture capitalists, and business debt - particularly bank 
loans and credit lines. Owner’s education and race have a significant impact on the type of capital 
injections over the business life cycle. Highly educated owners choose to inject lower proportions 
of personal debt and trade financing, whereas white owners inject lower proportions of personal 
equity and rely more on trade financing. 
 
Keywords: startups, financing structure; financial growth cycle theory; R&D intensity; intellectual 
property rights; survey methodology. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior research has explored the capital structure decisions of large, well-established 
publicly-traded firms. To date, however, very few extant studies have examined the dynamics of 
capital structure of newly formed businesses. The dynamics of capital structure refer to ways in 
which a business finances its overall operations and growth over time, as needs for different 
sources of funds—such as debt, equity or a combination of the two—differ in progressive stages 
of its development. In this article, we seek to explore how newly formed businesses finance their 
operations from inception to the later stages of their development. To do so, we use the financial 
growth cycle theory developed by Berger and Udell (1998) and empirically examine whether the 
capital structures of newly formed firms follow the predictions of this theory. Simultaneously, we 
also examine whether the pecking-order and trade-off theories explain the changes in capital 
structure of startup firms from inception to later stages of development. Our data is sourced from 
the Kauffman Firm Survey2 (KFS), the largest longitudinal data set comprised of 4,928 U.S. 
startups launched in 2004 and surveyed annually through 2011. The KFS provides a wealth of 
detailed information on both new firms and their owners, including performance data and 
information on financing sources and strategies as well as personal characteristics of the 
entrepreneur (Ballou et al., 2008).   
According to the evidence yielded by prior research in this field, in their attempts to raise 
debt and equity, new and small firms face different challenges than publicly held firms do. Extant 
research has shown that startup capital, as well as future capital injections, are crucial to firm 
survival. Most studies on capital structure that employed the KFS data have focused on the 
determinants of capital structure or the financing choices in the startup year. Thus, their authors 
did not use the full panel data set (2004-2011) as it was not available at the time the work was 
conducted (Coleman and Robb, 2012; Robb and Robinson, 2014; Coleman, Cotei, and Farhat, 
2016). While offering valuable findings, these studies largely ignore the sources of funding 
employed by a firm at various stages of its life cycle. Given that the full panel data and the imputed 
data of the KFS are now available, it is timely to examine the trajectories of small businesses’ 
financial structures and examine the determinants of various sources of capital injections in newly 
formed firms. The approach we adopt in this work is evolutionary, as it aims to ascertain how 
newly formed firms’ capital structures evolve over several years following their inception. 
Our results point to a significant financial growth pattern in the use of various sources of 
debt and equity during the life cycle of the business. Consistent with Berger and Udell’s model, 
we find that, at the startup stage, entrepreneurs rely on initial insider capital sources such as 
personal savings, financing provided by friends and family, quasi-equity, and personal debt. Over 
time, as businesses become less opaque, the proportion of business debt and trade credit financing 
in the total capital injection volume increases significantly. We further note that, although the 
proportion of owner’s equity in total capital injections decreases over time, the annual balance of 
owner’s equity increases, suggesting that owners use retained earnings to increase their ownership 
stake in the firm. 
Several business and owner characteristics explain the type and magnitude of various types 
of capital injections. Businesses with high information asymmetry rely more on equity injections, 
especially owner’s personal savings, whereas those undertaking innovative activities are more 
                                                          
2 Certain data included herein are derived from the Kauffman Firm Survey restricted-access data file. Any opinions, 
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. 
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likely to finance their operations with outside equity injections provided by angels and venture 
capitalists. A higher proportion of tangible assets explains the greater use of debt injections, both 
personal and business debt sources, whereas higher level of sales drives businesses to use both 
debt injections and trade finance and rely less on equity injections. Startups owned by two or more 
owners tend to inject more equity, especially outside equity and less debt into the capital structure 
of their business. Education and race also have a significant impact on the capital injections over 
the business life cycle. Highly educated owners choose to inject lower proportions of personal debt 
and trade financing, whereas white owners inject lower proportions of personal equity and rely 
more on trade financing. 
In providing the aforementioned findings, we contribute to the current stream of literature 
in three important ways. First, our results provide insights into the ways in which financial theory 
explains the capital injections in startup businesses. Using a Latent growth model to examine the 
systematic change in the financial structure of newly formed businesses we show that there is a 
significant financial growth pattern in the use of various sources of debt, equity and trade finance 
during the life cycle of the firm. Second, this article builds upon and contributes to the existing 
body of work carried out on small business financing in the startup year. Finally, our research 
makes use of a comprehensive data set - the Kauffman Firm Survey which represents a random 
sample of U.S. businesses launched in 2004, proportionally weighted across specific 
subpopulations. Therefore, the bias that often emerges from small or under-representative samples 
is completely removed. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. This brief introduction is followed by 
a section that presents our theoretical framework and situates our work in the context of pertinent 
research. Our data, including the characteristics of the Kauffman Firm Survey, methodology and 
results, are described in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 provides a summary of our findings and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses  
2.1. Life Cycle Theory of the Firm 
The financial growth life cycle model developed by Berger and Udell (1998) is based on 
the idea that firms have different financial needs and options as they grow and become less 
informationally opaque. Therefore, when facing a “size/age/information continuum,” smaller, 
younger, more opaque firms should predominantly rely on insider finance, trade credit and/or angel 
finance. On the other hand, as firms grow and become less opaque, they should rely more on 
intermediated finance, both debt (bank loans) and equity (venture capital). 
The financial growth life cycle model conceptualizes the fact that information opacity over 
the life cycle of the firm creates financial pecking order, suggesting that, in early stages of the 
firm’s life, the entrepreneur relies on initial insider financial sources (i.e., personal savings, loans 
from friends and family, quasi-equity, personal debt, and business debt), trade credit, and angel 
finance, whereas, at a later stage, firm gains access to external debt and equity and therefore, 
personal funding becomes relatively less important. The financial growth life cycle model predicts 
that the major capital structure variables will follow a specific trajectory over the life of the 
business. In line with this view, we hypothesize the following: 
H1(a): In the startup stage, owner’s personal savings and personal debt are the most 
important sources of financing. 
H1(b): Over time, the relative importance of owners’ equity and personal debt in total 
financing will decline, while the relative importance of business debt and trade credit in total 
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financing will increase. 
 
2.2. The Entrepreneur’s Personal Characteristics 
The literature on individual risk-taking behavior reveals that demographic and 
socioeconomic factors, such as age, gender, education, experience, and wealth, have a significant 
influence on individual risk tolerance.  McInish (1982) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that 
risk taking decreases with age and increases with education, income, wealth, experience, and 
sophistication. In addition, the entrepreneur’s gender may have an impact on type and size of their 
startup financing sources as males tend to be more risk tolerant than females. The empirical 
evidence on the impact of owners’ characteristics on startup financing has mixed results. Using a 
panel of 2,000 Dutch entrepreneurs, Verheul and Thurik (2001) show that, even though female 
entrepreneurs start with lower levels of startup capital, the proportion of debt and equity in total 
capital is similar to that of male entrepreneurs. For a sample of startups from 27 countries, 
Nofsinger and Wang (2011) report that experience in managing startups is the key factor in 
securing funding, as experienced owners are able to reduce information asymmetry and obtain 
financing in the first year of operations. Besides experience, education is another trait found to 
increase the likelihood of using credit in the startup year (Cole and Sokolyk, 2013). However, for 
a sample of Australian startups, Cassar (2004) reveal that owner’s demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics are irrelevant for capital structure decisions. The entrepreneur’s 
personal wealth may also affect the composition of capital in small businesses. For example, Cole 
et al. (2004) show that the commitment of a small business owner’s personal wealth is important 
to obtain external credit. Overall, these findings attest to the impact of owner characteristics, such 
as attitudes and beliefs, education, and experience, on financial decision-making. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
H2: The entrepreneur’s personal characteristics influence the type of capital injections in 
startup firms.  
 
2.3. The Pecking Order Model 
The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) is based on the idea of 
information asymmetry between the business and its potential investors. In other words, it posits 
that small business owners/managers know more about the true value of the firm and the firm’s 
riskiness than do less informed suppliers of capital. Thus, to avoid the underinvestment problem 
inherent in firms with informational opacity, small business owners will seek to finance new 
projects using personal funds (internal funds, personal debt) rather than business debt or external 
equity. The pecking order theory also explains why small firms tend to prefer debt to equity capital 
if external financing is required. Thus, unlike large, publicly-traded firms, small businesses should 
exhibit a positive relationship between informational asymmetry and the propensity for personal 
debt financing. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H3: Startups characterized by higher information opacity will rely more on internal equity 
and personal debt and less on business debt. 
In light of the underinvestment risk, Myers (1977, 1984) also suggested that firms with high growth 
options use less debt in order to preserve their debt capacity. Thus, we expect firms with higher 
growth options to rely less on debt financing. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H4: High growth options startups—those with extensive research and development (R&D) 
activity or those that possess intellectual property rights—rely more on internal and external 
equity and less on debt financing. 
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Firms possessing greater tangible assets are expected to have a higher debt capacity and lower 
costs of financial distress, because they have the option of pledging those assets as collateral. 
Consequently, firms with greater tangible assets have the ability to secure more debt and therefore, 
rely more on external business debt. Similarly, larger firms are often more diversified and more 
profitable relative to smaller firms. These characteristics make them more attractive to lenders. In 
light of that, if external funding is needed, we expect a positive relationship between firm size and 
the use of debt financing. 
 
2.4. The Trade-off Model 
The tax benefit−bankruptcy cost trade-off models (Baxter, 1967; DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Robichek and Myers, 1966; Scott, 1976) predict that firms 
will seek to maintain an optimal capital structure by balancing the benefits and the costs of debt. 
The benefits include the tax shield, whereas the costs comprise of expected financial distress costs, 
among others. According to this model, a firm’s profitability will be negatively related to the 
expected financial distress costs, since the probability that firms with higher and more stable profits 
will enter bankruptcy would be lower. In addition, larger firms typically experience lower profit 
volatility, and thus possess higher debt ratios relative to smaller firms.  
The existing agency cost trade-off models (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook, 1984; 
Stulz, 1990; Harris and Raviv, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995) consider the possible conflicts of 
interests between the parties involved in the firm, such as managers and outside investors. Overall, 
the trade-off and agency theories predict that firms maintain an optimum capital structure, where 
the marginal benefit of debt equals the marginal cost. In summary, for publicly traded firms, the 
trade-off models predict that higher debt will be associated with higher profitability, lower non-
debt tax shields, low growth opportunities, high asset tangibility, and lower expected bankruptcy 
costs.  
Startup businesses are less likely to take advantage of tax interest deductibility. The tax 
benefits are usually negligible, as some businesses generate little or no revenue in the first year of 
operation. In fact, prior research reveals that new, small firms are particularly susceptible to the 
problems of financial distress and failure. High failure rates, coupled with high monitoring costs 
for the suppliers of capital, make it difficult for startups to raise debt. Therefore, the trade-off 
theory predicts that startup firms use less debt due to high probability of failure. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) is the largest longitudinal survey of startup businesses 
in the United States. The survey data contain detailed information on 4,928 businesses founded in 
2004 and provide annual tracking information of their business status and performance until 2011. 
A business started in 2004 was defined as a new, independent business that was created by a single 
person or a team of people, the purchase of an existing business, or the purchase of a franchise. 
For each establishment, the database provides information about business characteristics, strategy 
and innovation, business organization and HR benefits, business finances, work behavior, 
ownership and demographics of up to ten owners. Detailed information on the business includes 
sources and types of capital in the startup year and over time, intellectual property rights (patents, 
trademarks, copyrights), R&D activity, physical location, whether the business provides a product, 
service or both, revenues, asset structure, sales, employment, and industry. Owners' characteristics 
(up to ten active-owner-operators per business) include: years of work experience, previous startup 
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experience, time commitment and education, net worth, age, gender, race and ethnicity. The 
definitions of variables used in this study are presented in the Appendix. 
In response to the Kauffman Foundation’s interest in understanding the dynamics of high-
technology, medium-technology, and women-owned businesses, the KFS sample is stratified 
based on industrial technology level (High-Tech, Medium-Tech, and Non-Tech sectors) 
oversampling businesses in high- and medium-tech sectors. It is a common practice in policy-
making surveys to oversample a key population subgroup in response to the small size of that 
subgroup or for a special interest in that subgroup. It is important to notice that oversampled high-
technology and medium-technology businesses in the KFS aim at increasing the precision of stand-
alone and comparative analyses of these sub-groups. 
Using a disproportionate stratified sampling requires a weighting scheme to make the KFS 
sample a representative sample of the target population. In the baseline survey and to account for 
oversampling, the initial weights were defined as the inverse of the probability of selection, which 
was calculated in each stratum. Next, the initial weights were adjusted to compensate for the 
businesses that did not respond or could not be located. A logistic propensity model was used to 
determine the probability of locating a business as well as to determine the propensity to respond 
in the survey. Given both probabilities and their inverses, the weights were adjusted to count for 
the joint conditional probability that a business was selected for sampling, was located, and 
responded in the survey. Finally, to make the data even more representative of the population a 
post-stratification was applied. Details of the use of proper weights for the KFS sample are 
available in Farhat (2012) and Farhat and Robb (2014). All analyses in this paper are performed 
using the weights and stratification.  
Although the missing observations in the KFS are not significant, the Kauffman foundation 
has released a multiply imputed data version of the KFS data. Used by statistical agencies, multiple 
imputation is a very popular methodology to handle nonresponse in public use surveys and to 
reduce measurement errors. The imputed values are ideally independent draws from the predictive 
distribution of the missing values conditional on the observed values. The KFS multiply imputed 
data include the original data along with five complete-data imputations (m=5). Using special 
procedures, analyzing multiply imputed data requires estimating the statistical model for each 
imputed dataset which is five in the case of KFS (Farhat and Robb, 2013). All analyses in this 
paper are performed on the KFS multiply imputed dataset.  
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 1 Panel A we report the main characteristics of businesses comprising our sample. 
On average, about 61 percent of firms have limited liability (S-corporations and LLC), while the 
remaining 39 percent are organized as proprietorships and partnerships. In addition, about 83 
percent of firms operate in an urban location and half of the startups operate from owners' homes. 
The data also reveal that about 87 percent of startups provide services, 48 percent provide products, 
and 35 percent provide both services and products. Our information asymmetry proxy is very 
volatile during the 2004−2011 period. On average, 14 per cent of startups have no available 
information to calculate the commercial credit score and are therefore classified as high 
information asymmetry firms. Startups’ size, measured by ln(assets), has a growth rate of 10 
percent, whereas sales growth rate is about 53 percent for the 2004−2011 period. Credit risk score 
(a measure of firms’ riskiness) decreased from 3.41 to 2.9 across the sample period. Data also 
show that less than 20 percent of firms report any form of intellectual property rights (IP) such as 
copyrights and patents or R&D activity. A high proportion of firms (63.35 percent) indicate that 
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they have a comparative advantage (something unique and distinctive) relative to their competitors 
in the startup year (2004). However, the proportion of firms with comparative advantages 
decreases to 41.39 per cent in the last year of survey (2011). On average, the number of employees 
increases from 1.06 individuals per firm in the first year of operation to about 2.92 in 2011. About 
41 percent of firms’ total assets are tangible assets. On average, firms reported about $22,067 in 
annual profit during their first eight years of operation.   
In Table 1 Panel B we show the distribution of our sample across industries. With respect 
to industry stratification, our sample consists of 1.88 percent high-tech firms, 14.20 percent 
medium-tech firms, and 83.92 percent non-tech firms. Using the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS), the majority of firms in our sample are in the service and retail 
trade sectors (71 per cent), while the lowest percentage of firms operate in the manufacturing sector 
(5.84 per cent).  
Table 1 Panel C shows the detailed owners’ characteristics. The data reveal that the average 
age of the entrepreneurs was forty-seven years across the sample period (2004−2011). The 
entrepreneurs in our sample had an average of 11.90 years of industry experience. Owners devoted 
about 39 hours per week to their business and, in about 47 percent of startups, the entrepreneurs 
are highly educated (having earned college degree or higher). With respect to gender and race, 
68.22 percent of firms were owned by male entrepreneurs, about 5 percent have Hispanic owner, 
and 83.78 percent of the sample firms are owned by white entrepreneurs.  
The KFS survey provides information on various types of debt and equity financing 
sources. For the purpose of our analyses, we classify the financing variables into “insider” and 
“outsider” debt or equity, based on the fact that insiders providing capital have more information 
about the business than outsiders do. Insider’s personal debt consists of personal debt from family 
and others, whereas personal credit cards and personal bank loans are considered outsider’s 
personal debt. In the same vein, insider’s business debt comprises of business debt from family, 
employees, and other individuals. On the other hand, outsider’s business debt consists of credit 
cards, bank loans, government’s loans, and loans from other businesses. Owner’s equity consists 
of equity provided by the owner(s). Insider’s equity consists of equity provided by spouse and/or 
parents, whereas outsider’s equity includes equity provided by the angels, venture capitalists, 
government and/or companies.   
Figure 1 describes the sources of finance available to small businesses over time. In the 
startup stage, businesses must rely on initial insider equity, angel finance and venture capital. As 
startup businesses grow over time, they gain access to a broader spectrum of sources of external 
business debt. Over time, accumulation of trading history enables access to better sources and 
amounts of external financing, particularly trade credit.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Table 2 Panel A shows the annual balance for each source of financing. Consistent with 
financial growth life cycle theory, the portion of owner’s equity financing relative to other sources 
of funding is the highest in the early years of the startup life cycle (53.68 in 2004).  The data also 
indicate that the proportion of personal debt decreases steadily over time, while the proportion of 
business debt slightly increases before the 2008-2009 financial crisis. However, following the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the proportion of business debt in total financing started to 
gradually decline over time. Insider’s business debt shows a steady decrease over time, while both 
owners’ equity and trade financing balances increased in the same period.  Although the proportion 
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of insider and outsider equity balances decreases over time, data show that the proportion of 
owner’s equity increases during the sample period. This change in balance could be due to the fact 
that startup businesses are building up owners’ equity by reinvesting the profit into the business.  
 
Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 here 
 
The major postulate of the financial growth life cycle is that as startups advance on the 
size/age/information continuum, the financial sources of capital also change. The data presented 
in Panel B of Table 2 along with Figures 2−>5 show the trajectories of each source of annual 
capital injections. As can be seen, the percentage of total equity injections (owners’, insiders’, and 
outsiders’ equity) decreased steadily from 59.04 percent in 2004 to 24.75 percent in 2011. On the 
other hand, the proportion of trade finance as a source of financing increased from 10.26 percent 
to 27.13 per cent during the same time period. Similarly, business debt annual injections increased 
steadily from 7.79 percent in 2004 to 18.39 percent in 2011. Meanwhile, personal debt annual 
injections increased from 22.92 percent to 29.74 percent. It is worth noting that insider’s personal 
debt annual injections decreased from 3.41 percent in 2004 to 2.43 per cent in 2011, while personal 
credit card injections, the major source of personal debt financing, increased from 11.15 percent 
to 22.83 per cent. In addition, the annual personal bank loan injections decreased from 8.35 percent 
in 2004 to 4.48 percent in 2011. The majority of the increase in business debt injections stems 
from an increase in the use of credit lines from 1.33 percent in 2004 to 9.61 percent in 2011. 
Business credit card injections also show an increase from 1.73 percent to 7.06 percent in the same 
period. While these descriptive statistics help us summarize our variables in an efficient and easily 
understood manner, the do not confirm the significance of the trend noted in these variables over 
time. Thus, we test the significance of trajectories these variables follow via a multivariate 
analysis. 
Table 2 here 
 
 
3.3. Multivariate Analysis 
3.3.1. Trajectory of financial capital injections  
The financial growth life cycle theory predicts that the major capital structure variables 
follow a specific trajectory over the life of the business. In this section, we test the postulates of 
this theory, namely hypotheses H1(a) and H1(b). For the purpose of investigating the systematic 
change (growth/decline) in the financial structure variables we use Latent growth modeling, 
employing the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) statistical technique. Unlike standard 
regressions, the Latent growth model incorporates the ‘time’ factor explicitly. To account for 
information opacity across the different stages of the life cycle, we estimate the following model: 
Level-1 equation (measurement model): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋0𝑖 + 𝜋1𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
2 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  , for 𝑖 = 1,2, . . 𝑛 and 𝑡 = 1,2, . . 𝑇. 
Level-2 equations (structural model): 
𝜋0𝑖 = 𝛾00 + 𝜇0𝑖 
𝜋1𝑖 = 𝛾10 + 𝜇1𝑖 
𝜋12 = 𝛾20 + 𝜇2𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the response variable for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝜋0𝑖 is a latent variable that represents the 
level-1 intercept (endowments “initial status”), 𝜋1𝑖 is a latent variable that represents the change 
trajectory (rate of change), and 𝜋2𝑖 captures the acceleration in the variables’ growth trajectories. 
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In the level-2 equations, 𝛾00, 𝛾10, and 𝛾20 are the intercepts or the average value of 𝜋0𝑖, 𝜋1𝑖 , 𝜋12, 
respectively. 
The terms 𝜇0𝑖, 𝜇1𝑖 , and 𝜇2𝑖 are random effects representing individual deviations from the 
overall sample means. These terms distinguish each firm’s intercept (𝜋0𝑖) and slope (𝜋1𝑖 , 𝜋12) 
from the overall sample mean and intercept. Heterogeneity in the firm intercept and slope 
parameters is determined by examining 𝜎𝜇0𝑖
2 , 𝜎𝜇1𝑖
2 , and 𝜎𝜇02
2 . In other words, differences in firm 
intercepts and slopes exist if 𝜎𝜇0𝑖
2 , 𝜎𝜇1𝑖
2  , and 𝜎𝜇02
2  are different from zero. 
The model possesses several important advantages. First, it allows variability [𝜇1𝑖] in the 
rate of change, i.e. some firms are changing more than others and have larger slopes, some are 
improving (positive slopes), some are declining (negative slopes), and some firms exhibit no 
change at all (zero slopes). Second, the model allows to introduce variance in both the slope and 
intercept; it measures how much firms differ at startup as well as determines the difference in their 
rates of change over time. Third, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
2 allows us to control for any non-linearity in the model. 
In addition to the hierarchical linear modeling (random effect) we use the fixed effects 
models to estimate the trajectory of financial capital injections as a robustness test. In the fixed 
effects models, the model to be fitted is represented by the following set of equations: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋1𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  , for 𝑖 = 1,2, . . 𝑛 and 𝑡 = 1,2, . . 𝑇. 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜋1𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡   
In the above model, the idiosyncratic error (𝜈𝑖𝑡) varies time and among firms, where 
𝐸(𝜈𝑖𝑡) = 0  , 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜈𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜈
2 , (𝜈𝑖𝑡, 𝜈𝑗𝑡) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝜈𝑖𝑠) = 0 for all 𝑡 and 𝑠 and it is 
allowed to have 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖, 𝜈𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 or 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0. In this fixed effects approach, 𝜇𝑖 is treated 
as a firm-specific error term in the regression model. The firm-specific error does not change over 
time and every firm has a fixed value on this variable. The fixed-effects model controls for all 
time-invariant differences among firms. Thus, we are controlling for heterogeneity among firms 
and any other time-invariant unobservable variables.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating both the random and fixed effects models. In terms 
of significance, while both models produce identical results the values of coefficients they yield 
are slightly different. The majority of the financial capital variables exhibit a significant nonlinear 
relationship over time. The results show strong evidence of a significant financial growth pattern 
in the use of debt and equity sources during the life cycle of the firm. Consistent with the financial 
growth life cycle model, the entrepreneur relies on initial insider financial capital (personal 
savings, finance from friends and family, quasi-equity, and personal debt) and trade credit. Owner 
equity injections start at a high level and exhibit a decrease over time. The total personal debt 
injections increase in the first four years of the startup life, after which they start to decline. There 
is no evidence that outsiders’ equity is increasing during the life of the startup businesses, as 
predicted by the financial growth life cycle model. On the other hand, business debt and trade 
credit financing variables show a strong support for financial growth life cycle model. In particular, 
both business credit line and business credit card start to play an increasingly significant role over 
time. Thus, our results strongly support the hypotheses that entrepreneurs’ personal resources are 
most important sources of funding at the startup stage; over time, the relative importance of 
insider’s equity (including owners’ equity) in financing the firm declines. The relative importance 
10 
 
of owners’ personal debt in financing the firm declines as well, whereas the relative importance of 
business debt in financing the firm increases over time. The results also show that the relative 
importance of trade credit in financing the firm increases over time. 
 
3.3.2. Determinants of financial capital injections and its components 
To gain further insight into the factors affecting the financial capital injections, we also 
explore the determinants of various types of business and personal debt injections in total financial 
capital injection volume for our sample of startup firms. Since our dependent variables are ratios 
that are bounded by zero we use Tobit regressions to obtain consistent estimators. Let 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = the 
financial capital injections proportion of the i-th firm as a percentage of total financing at time t 
and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = the vector of independent variables of the i-th firm at time t. Since our dependent 
variables are ratios that are bounded by zero, the dependent variable is truncated. 
iii xy   10  , where 0iy  for Ni ,,1 and ),0(
2 Ni   
Neglecting the truncation can lead to biased estimates of 0 and 1 . 
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The last term on the right-hand-side of the above equation is the Mills ratio. 
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Our independent variables are proxies that have been widely used in the finance literature 
to explain the determinants of capital structure in large, publicly traded firms. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) argued that as larger firms become more diversified they face lower probability of 
bankruptcy. This link suggests that the larger the firm size, the higher the firm’s debt capacity. 
Since large firms tend to possess more collateralized assets and have more stable cash flows, the 
company’s size is inversely related to the probability of default allowing it to carry more debt. 
Diamond (1991) also noted that large established firms have better reputation in the debt markets, 
which allows them to carry more debt. Thus the size variable, measured by the log of total sales, 
is expected to be positively related to debt financing.  
Tangible assets (collateral) convey information to investors about the quality of a firm as 
well as reduce the degree of information asymmetry and opaqueness. The use of collateral is 
prevalent in external debt contracts as a means of mitigating informational asymmetry that may 
result in credit rationing or denial of credit (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). Typically, 
small businesses pledge assets owned by the firm, i.e. inside collateral that includes firm assets 
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such as inventories, receivables, or plant and equipment. Most theoretical research suggests that 
inside collateral helps reduce adverse selection and prevent credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a, 1987b). Asset structure is an important predictor of the ability 
to raise intermediated debt. Firms possessing more tangible assets are more likely to use them as 
inside collateral, therefore reducing the informational asymmetry between lenders and owners. We 
use the ratio of the property, plant, and equipment to total book assets as our proxy for collateral 
(Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Ang, 1992).  
Myers (1977, 1984) suggested that firms with diverse growth options use less debt in order 
to preserve their debt capacity. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman and Wessels 
(1988) argued that firms with high growth options depend on equity financing more than on debt 
financing. Their argument suggests a negative relationship between leverage and growth options. 
Thus, we expect to find firms with greater growth options as measured by intellectual property 
rights and/or R&D activity to be less reliant on debt financing (H4). On the other hand, the financial 
growth life cycle model postulates that small firms with high growth opportunities are associated 
with more information asymmetry, and would thus use more internal capital and personal debt.  
The adverse selection model (Myers and Majluf’s (1984) implies a pecking order in 
financing small firms: retained earnings first, followed by debt and then external equity. To avoid 
the underinvestment problem owners seek to finance new projects using internal funds or riskless 
debt. We control for internal equity (retained earnings) by using the profit to assets ratio. It is 
expected that firms with high information asymmetry will exhaust their internal equity before 
seeking external funding. Thus, we predict a negative relationship between capital injections and 
profitability.  
The main prediction of the life-cycle theory is that firms characterized by high information 
asymmetry rely more on informal capital and less on formal credit channels. Thus, small firms 
first seek insider finance before pursuing angel finance and trade credit and only later rely on 
intermediated external finance (Berger and Udell, 1998; Sahlman, 1990). In contrast, firms with 
less information asymmetry should rely on outside debt financing as the main source of capital 
(H3). Therefore, we expect that firms with high information asymmetry exhibit a financing 
behavior more consistent with the life-cycle theory model. We use the availability of credit score 
and financial distress score as a proxy for information asymmetry. In addition, in our analyses we 
employ the location of the business (home based vs. leased location) as an indicator variable which 
proxies for the availability of information about the business. It is expected that businesses 
operating from the owner’s home have a more pronounced information asymmetry problem. 
To control for owners’ characteristics we include gender, education, and race in our 
analysis. In addition, since financial decision-making is strictly influenced by the ownership 
structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and to address different levels of ownership control we 
include a dummy variable for small businesses that are owned by more than one owner.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
In Table 4 Panel A we present the coefficients of firm and owner characteristics that explain 
the relative size of personal debt injections and its components. The coefficients for R&D are 
positive and significant suggesting that the higher the growth options, the higher the proportion of 
personal debt injection in total capital injection volume. In addition, we show that firms with higher 
credit risk use more insider’s personal debt and rely less on personal bank loans. The coefficients 
for tangible assets show a positive and significant effect across all types of personal debt, consistent 
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with prior results demonstrating that firms with more tangible assets have higher debt capacity. 
The coefficient for sales is positive and significant for all types of personal debt injections, except 
insider’s debt suggesting that firms with a higher level of sales have the ability to acquire many 
types of personal debt. Although the coefficient for information asymmetry proxy is not significant 
in Panel A, suggesting that it has no impact on the personal debt injections, it is statistically 
significant in Panel B. Thus, firms with high information asymmetry have lower injections of 
business debt in their capital structure. Home based firms use less insider’s personal debt and 
personal bank loan injections, but more capital injections in the form of personal credit cards. The 
findings also suggest that profitability lowers the need to use any type of personal debt injections. 
Team owned firms tend to be less reliant on insider, outsider, and personal credit card debt 
injections but they use more personal loans as capital injections. More educated owners and owners 
with longer working experience use less personal debt injections. In addition, male owners tend to 
use personal credit card less and rely more on personal bank loans. White owners use less insider’s 
debt and personal credit card injections, while using more personal bank loan injections.  
In Table 4 Panel B we present the coefficients of firm and owner characteristics that explain 
the relative size of business debt injections and its components. Given the use of business debt 
financing, we find that firms with high growth options use more business debt injections across all 
types of business debt. Moreover, firms with intellectual property rights tend to have more business 
debt injections relative to other firms. Credit risk shows that firms with higher risk will use fewer 
injections from outsiders, and are also less reliant on credit line, credit card, and bank loans. 
Tangible assets play a significant role as collateral in case of outsider, business credit cards, 
business bank loans, and other business loan injections. Large firms tend to use more business debt 
injections. The coefficient for our information asymmetry proxy is negative and significant, 
suggesting that informationally opaque firms are less likely to use outsiders’ debt, credit line, credit 
card, and bank loan capital injections. This result is consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Berger and Udell (1998) who noted that informationally opaque 
firms are less likely to access debt financing due to severe frictions in the debt markets. Our results 
also show that home based firms are less likely to use business debt injections across all types of 
business debt available to the firms. Profitable, less constrained firms use fewer business debt 
injections. We also show that several owner characteristics explain the proportion of business debt 
injections in startup firms. For example, gender is a significant factor in determining the proportion 
of business debt injections. Across all types of business debt injections, male owners use more 
business debt relative to female owners. With respect to race, white entrepreneurs rely less on 
insider’s business injection and credit card financing. On the other hand, we find that owners' level 
of education and work experience do not affect the proportion of business debt injections. 
In Table 4 Panel C we present the coefficients of firm and owner characteristics that explain 
the relative size of equity injections and its components. Higher growth options increase both the 
proportion of equity injections and trade finance. Firms with high credit risk rely more on owner’s 
equity injections and less on debt injections or trade finance injections. Firms with higher sales use 
fewer owner’s equity injections and rely more on debt or trade finance injections. The results also 
show that higher information asymmetry prompts firms to use more equity injections and less trade 
finance or debt injections. Home-based firms rely on using owner’s equity more and insiders’ and 
outsiders’ equity injections less. Profitability reduces the use of both equity and debt capital 
injections. Team owned firms use more equity injections and less debt injections. Male owners use 
less owner’s equity injections and rely more on outsiders’ equity and trade finance capital 
injections. Finally, white owners use less equity injections while favoring trade finance injections.  
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4. Conclusions  
In this article we examine small business financing through a growth cycle paradigm in 
which different combinations of capital are optimal at different points in the business life cycle. 
Unlike publicly held firms, small businesses in the startup stage finance their operations with 
insiders’ capital such as owners’ equity, funds from family and friends. As the business grows, 
outsiders’ sources of capital may become available. The key feature that drives the financial 
growth cycle is informational opacity. Early in the growth cycle, small businesses typically lack 
business assets that can be used as collateral, have little repayment history or record of profitability, 
and do not have audited financial statements. Therefore, providers of outside capital put 
considerable weight on the creditworthiness and reputation of the entrepreneur who may have a 
longer credit history and personal assets that can be used as collateral. 
Our results point to a significant financial growth pattern in the use of various sources of 
debt and equity during the life cycle of the firm. Consistent with Berger and Udell’s model, at the 
startup stage entrepreneurs rely on initial insider’s capital sources. Over time, as firms become less 
opaque, the proportion of business debt and trade credit financing in total capital injections 
increases significantly. Although the proportion of owner’s equity in total capital injections 
decreases over time, the annual balance of owner’s equity increases suggesting that owners use 
retained earnings to increase their ownership stake in the firm. 
Several business and owner characteristics explain the type and magnitude of various types 
of capital injections. Firms characterized by high information asymmetry rely more on equity 
injections, especially owner’s personal savings, whereas those undertaking innovative activities 
finance their operations with outsiders’ equity injections. A higher proportion of tangible assets 
explains greater use of debt injections (both personal and business debt sources), whereas higher 
level of sales drives firms to use both debt injections and trade finance, relying less on equity 
injections. Firms owned by two or more owners tend to inject more equity (especially outside 
equity) and less debt in the capital structure of their firms. Education and race have a significant 
impact on the capital injections over the business life cycle. Highly educated owners choose to 
inject lower proportions of personal debt and trade financing, whereas white owners inject lower 
proportions of personal equity and rely more on trade financing. 
This article contributes to the current stream of literature by providing insights into the 
ways in which the sources and magnitude of capital injections in startup firms differ from those of 
large, publicly held firms. The reported findings reveal the systematic changes in the financial 
structure of newly formed businesses and show that there is a significant financial growth pattern 
in the use of various sources of debt, equity, and trade finance during the life cycle of small firms. 
Finally, our research results demonstrate that entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics play an 
important role in the use and magnitude of a specific type of capital injection. 
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Appendix: Variable Description 
Variable Description 
Asian Equals 1 if the majority of owners are Asian, =0 otherwise 
Black 
Equals 1 if the majority of owners are Black or African American (Non-
Hispanic), =0 otherwise 
White Equals 1 if the majority of owners are White (Non-Hispanic) , =0 otherwise 
Other 
Equals 1 if owners have no predominant race as well as other races not 
included above (American Indian, Alaska native, Native Hawaiian , other 
Pacific Islander, other, unknown), =0 otherwise 
Hispanic 
Equals 1 if the majority of owners are Hispanic (regardless of race), =0 
otherwise 
Gender Equals1 if the majority of owners are males, =0 otherwise 
Education  
Equals 1 if the majority of owners have college degree or above, =0 
otherwise 
Age Average age of the owners (in years) 
Work Experience Average work experience of the owners (in years)  
Commitment  The sum of number of hours worked weekly by the owner(s) 
Startup Experience Equals 1 if at least one owner had started other businesses, =0 otherwise 
Home Based Equals 1 if home based  business, =0 otherwise 
Employees Number of employees (for businesses with  employees>0) 
Comp. Adv. Equals 1 if business has a comparative advantage, =0 otherwise 
Self Employed Percentage of owners who are paid employees in the business 
R&D Activity 
Equals 1 if business has at least one employee responsible for R&D, =0 
otherwise 
Intellectual Property Equals 1 if business has patent or copyright or trademark, =0 otherwise 
Provide Service Equals 1 if business provides service , =0 otherwise 
Provide Product Equals 1 if business provides  product, =0 otherwise 
Provide Service 
And Product 
Equals 1 if business provides service and product, =0 otherwise 
Information Proxy Equals 1 if D&B did not report a credit score for the business , =0 otherwise  
Assets (Ln) The logarithm of  (total assets($)+1) at the start-up year (2004) 
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Appendix: Variable Description- continued 
Variable Description 
Sales(ln) The logarithm of  (total sales($)+1) at the start-up year (2004) 
Tangible Assets  The logarithm of tangible assets  
Credit risk 
D&B Commercial Credit Score (1 very low risk,………..,  5 very high 
risk) 
Profitability Equals 1 if business have profit in year t, =0 otherwise 
Team Equals 1 if business owned by more than one owner 
Large rural city/town 
The RUCA  code system: 3.0, 4.0, 4.2, 5.0, 5.2, 6.0, 6.1, 7.2, 8.2, and 
10.2 
Small rural town 
The RUCA  code system: 7.0, 7.3, 7.4, 8.0, 8.3, 8.4, 9.0, 9.1, 9.2, and 
10.3 
Isolated small rural town The RUCA  code system: 10.0, 10.4, 10.5, and 10.6 
High-tech Equals 1 if  business is in a high-tech industry, =0 otherwise 
Medium-tech Equals 1 if  business is in a medium-tech industry, =0 otherwise 
Non-tech Equals 1 if  business is in a non-tech industry, =0 otherwise 
Personal Debt: Insiders 
Personal debt  from friends and family injections (balance) to Total 
capital injections (balance) 
Personal Debt: Outsiders  
Personal credit card & bank loans injections (balance) to Total capital 
injections (balance) 
Personal Credit Card % 
Personal credit card injections (balance) to Total capital injections 
(balance) 
Personal Bank Loans % 
Personal bank loans injections (balance) to Total capital injections 
(balance) 
Personal Debt: Total  
Personal debt  injections (balance) to Total capital injections 
(balance) 
Business Debt: Insiders  
Business debt  from friends and family injections(balance) to Total 
capital injections (balance) 
Business Debt: Outsiders 
Personal credit card, bank loans, other loan and credit line injections 
(balance) to Total capital injections (balance) 
Business Credit Line % 
Business credit line injections(balance) to Total capital injections 
(balance) 
Business Credit Card % 
Business credit card injections(balance) to Total capital injections 
(balance) 
Business Bank Loan % 
Business Bank loans injections (balance) to Total capital injections 
(balance)/ balance to Total injections / balance 
Business Other Loan % 
Business other loans injections (balance) to Total capital injections 
(balance) 
Business Debt : Total Business debt injections (balance) to Total capital injections (balance) 
Debt: Total  Debt injections (balance) to Total capital injections (balance) 
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Equity: Owner  
Owners’ equity injections (balance) to Total capital injections 
(balance) 
Equity: Insider 
Equity  from friends and family injections (balance) to Total capital 
injections (balance) 
Equity: Outsider 
Equity  from angels, venture capitalists, government and/or 
companies injections (balance) to Total capital injections (balance) 
Equity: Total 
Insider and outsider equity injections (balance) to Total capital 
injections (balance) 
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Figure 1: Firm continuum and sources of finance 
Firm size  
Firm age  
Information 
availability 
 
Very small firms, 
possibly with no 
collateral and no 
track record. 
Small firms, possibly 
with high growth 
potential but often 
with limited track 
record. 
 
Medium-sized firms. 
Some track record. 
Collateral available, 
if necessary. 
Large firms of known 
risk and track record. 
 
← Initial Insider Finance →    
←  Angel Finance     → ←  Venture Capital    → ←        Public Equity                → 
 ←                                                          Trade Credit                                                    → 
   ←     Commercial Paper   → 
←               Short-term Financial Institution loans                      →  
 ←                    Intermediate-term Financial Institution loans               
→ 
 ←Mezzanine Fund Financing→ ←              Medium Term Notes         → 
  ←              Private Placement              → 
   ←    Public debt     → 
Source: Berger and Udell (1998, p. 623) 
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Table 1 Firm level characteristics 
Panel A: Business 
Characteristics 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2004-2011 
Legal status          
Proprietorship % 35.70 34.75 34.05 33.90 34.83 33.67 32.52 31.13 34.09 
LLC % 30.68 31.04 31.56 30.61 31.06 31.64 32.41 34.09 31.45 
Corporation % 27.81 28.94 29.54 30.72 29.83 30.66 31.10 30.68 29.67 
Partnership % 5.82 5.28 4.85 4.78 4.28 4.02 3.97 4.10 4.79 
Location          
Home-based % 50.43 50.23 50.22 51.13 50.77 50.43 49.17 48.52 50.21 
Leased space, Other % 49.57 49.77 49.78 48.87 49.23 49.57 50.83 51.48 49.79 
Urban % 83.00 83.13 82.88 83.12 82.47 82.24 83.18 83.26 82.92 
Large Rural Town % 8.87 8.59 8.74 8.74 9.13 8.90 8.55 8.48 8.76 
Small Rural Town  % 4.36 4.31 4.22 4.19 4.36 4.54 4.26 4.14 4.30 
Isolated Small Rural Town % 3.73 3.92 4.09 3.88 4.03 4.31 4.00 4.12 3.98 
Number of banks( by Zip code)  9.12 9.05 8.98 9.01 9.09 9.01 9.10 9.05 9.05 
Provide Services % 85.67 87.64 87.40 86.94 87.59 86.59 86.91 87.22 86.95 
Provide Products % 51.15 50.72 48.20 47.37 46.81 44.94 45.44 42.79 47.82 
Provide Services and Products  % 37.06 38.67 35.79 34.68 34.72 32.00 32.70 30.47 35.09 
Information proxy % 23.57 1.88 12.64 14.64 8.28 16.58 17.46 21.22 14.23 
Assets (Ln) 9.13 9.85 9.94 9.95 9.95 9.93 10.03 10.02 9.80 
Sales (Ln) 6.84 8.19 8.42 8.68 9.14 10.14 10.16 10.47 8.73 
Credit risk 3.41 3.26 3.01 2.92 2.82 2.86 2.95 2.90 3.06 
Firms with IP rights % 19.30 19.67 20.54 19.19 18.72 17.73 18.76 17.74 19.11 
Firms with R&D activity % 17.58 17.42 18.72 15.25 14.41 12.42 11.72 11.96 15.50 
Firms with Comparative 
Advantage % 63.35 66.29 63.01 59.73 56.74 46.27 46.22 41.39 57.34 
Employees 1.06 1.94 2.28 2.26 2.26 2.37 2.59 2.92 2.09 
Tangible Assets (Ln) 7.01 7.59 7.58 7.68 7.64 7.55 7.77 7.66 7.52 
Net Profit ($) -2929 13289 29813 28033 25800 26543 33033 47145 22067 
N 3140 2837 2554 2330 2092 1928 1775 1630 18286 
 
 
22 
 
Table 1: continued  
Panel B: Industry 
Classification 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2004-2011 
Construction  % 10.50 11.01 10.82 11.13 10.88 11.41 11.56 11.24 11.00 
Manufacturing  % 5.90 6.10 5.87 5.53 5.91 5.95 5.66 5.60 5.84 
Wholesale & Retail trade  % 20.74 19.81 19.93 19.70 19.27 18.41 17.65 17.70 19.39 
Services  % 50.81 51.52 51.29 50.64 51.64 52.21 53.08 53.17 51.62 
Finance, insurance, real estate  
% 10.78 10.29 10.87 11.55 10.82 10.56 10.62 10.87 10.79 
Other 1.26 1.26 1.22 1.45 1.48 1.46 1.43 1.42 1.35 
High-tech firms % 1.79 1.80 1.89 1.86 1.89 1.91 1.99 2.07 1.88 
Medium-tech firms % 13.20 13.42 14.17 14.39 14.41 14.83 15.09 15.52 14.20 
Non-tech firms % 85.00 84.78 83.94 83.76 83.71 83.25 82.92 82.41 83.92 
Panel C: Owners' characteristics          
Age (years) 44.80 45.77 46.86 47.99 49.12 50.04 45.96 46.61 46.93 
Work experience (years) 11.45 11.53 11.79 11.96 12.04 12.20 12.40 12.58 11.90 
Startup experience % 79.51 77.81 78.42 79.90 79.99 79.09 80.95 80.22 79.34 
Time commitment (hours/week) 40.75 40.41 39.60 38.72 38.15 37.27 36.97 37.30 38.98 
Education          
  College degree and above % 45.45 45.06 46.13 46.75 47.42 48.57 49.21 49.56 46.89 
  Less than college degree % 54.55 54.94 53.87 53.25 52.58 51.43 50.79 50.44 53.11 
Self Employed 46.43 51.12 52.35 54.10 50.70 52.41 53.88 52.89 51.32 
Gender          
  Male % 68.17 67.83 68.07 68.25 67.83 68.37 68.70 69.05 68.22 
  Female % 31.83 32.17 31.93 31.75 32.17 31.63 31.30 30.95 31.78 
Race          
  White  % 83.04 83.86 84.03 83.74 83.96 84.02 83.88 84.14 83.78 
  Asian  % 3.00 2.85 2.99 3.24 3.45 3.66 3.83 3.98 3.28 
  Black  % 8.20 7.69 7.82 7.84 7.87 7.48 7.57 7.15 7.76 
  Other  % 5.76 5.60 5.16 5.18 4.72 4.84 4.72 4.73 5.18 
  Hispanic %                   5.59 5.25 5.02 4.71 4.50 4.62 4.82 4.42 4.95 
N 3140 2837 2554 2330 2092 1928 1775 1630 18286 
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Table 2 Firm level financial capital  
 
Panel A: Balance- year end 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2004-2011 
Personal Debt: Insiders 3.11 1.33 1.02 0.97 0.65 0.50 0.46 0.51 1.25 
Personal Debt: Outsiders  18.65 13.11 12.36 12.24 11.08 9.81 8.18 6.65 12.31 
  Personal Credit Card % 10.59 8.71 8.45 9.10 8.41 7.49 6.51 5.39 8.41 
  Personal Bank Loans % 8.06 4.40 3.91 3.14 2.67 2.32 1.67 1.26 3.90 
Total Personal Debt  21.76 14.44 13.38 13.21 11.73 10.32 8.65 7.16 13.56 
Business Debt: Insiders  1.13 0.50 0.36 0.15 0.30 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.42 
Business Debt: Outsiders 6.50 6.40 7.27 7.17 7.29 5.75 5.68 5.88 6.56 
  Business Credit Line % 1.36 1.59 2.25 2.32 2.81 2.40 2.49 2.74 2.14 
  Business Credit Card % 1.82 2.37 2.89 2.78 2.48 1.84 1.85 1.98 2.27 
  Business Bank Loan % 3.09 2.29 2.08 1.93 1.80 1.47 1.26 1.13 2.02 
  Business Other Loan % 1.36 0.66 0.41 0.29 0.50 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.55 
Total Business Debt 7.63 6.90 7.63 7.32 7.59 5.89 5.77 6.04 6.98 
Debt: Total  29.39 21.34 21.01 20.53 19.33 16.20 14.42 13.20 20.54 
Equity: Owner  53.68 61.72 60.68 61.01 62.11 63.74 65.18 66.85 61.05 
Equity: Insider 1.04 0.53 0.45 0.31 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.43 
Equity: Outsider 1.20 0.73 0.61 0.38 0.37 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.56 
Total Equity 55.92 62.99 61.73 61.70 62.67 64.09 65.51 67.18 62.05 
Trade finance  7.62 9.35 10.38 10.33 10.88 12.16 12.18 11.86 10.25 
Liability 14.68 15.67 17.25 17.77 18.01 19.71 20.07 19.63 17.41 
N 3140 2837 2554 2330 2092 1928 1775 1630 18286 
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Panel B: Annual capital injections 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2004-2011 
Personal Debt: Insiders  3.41 3.05 2.94 2.46 3.11 2.93 2.37 2.43 2.94 
Personal Debt: Outsiders 19.50 26.69 28.96 31.21 31.67 31.71 29.40 27.31 27.24 
 Personal Credit Card % 11.15 18.12 20.67 23.76 25.31 25.58 24.07 22.83 19.91 
 Personal Bank Loans % 8.35 8.57 8.29 7.45 6.36 6.13 5.32 4.48 7.33 
Total Personal Debt 22.92 29.74 31.90 33.68 34.78 34.64 31.77 29.74 30.18 
Business Debt: Insiders  1.25 1.24 1.19 0.50 0.82 0.47 0.70 0.65 0.94 
Business Debt: Outsiders 6.54 11.05 14.42 16.37 16.58 16.75 16.30 17.74 13.20 
 Business Credit Line % 1.33 2.80 4.78 5.93 7.47 7.98 7.85 9.61 4.75 
 Business Credit Card % 1.73 4.73 6.54 6.83 6.40 6.41 6.99 7.06 5.26 
 Business Bank Loan % 3.15 3.26 3.27 3.91 3.52 3.77 2.76 2.94 3.33 
Business Other Loan % 1.58 1.63 1.42 1.00 1.21 0.69 1.29 1.10 1.31 
Total Business Debt 7.79 12.29 15.60 16.87 17.40 17.22 16.99 18.39 14.14 
Total Debt 30.70 42.03 47.51 50.55 52.18 51.86 48.76 48.12 44.32 
Equity: Owner  56.82 35.97 30.15 26.94 25.44 23.08 24.00 23.83 34.49 
Equity: Insiders 0.98 0.76 0.62 0.46 0.31 0.41 0.28 0.41 0.61 
Equity: Outsiders 1.23 1.22 0.84 0.71 0.55 0.47 0.23 0.51 0.83 
Total Equity 59.04 37.96 31.61 28.10 26.30 23.97 24.50 24.75 35.93 
Trade Finance 10.26 20.01 20.89 21.35 21.52 24.17 26.74 27.13 19.75 
N 3140 2837 2554 2330 2092 1928 1775 1630 18286 
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Table 3 Financial growth pattern over time 
 
 Random effect model Fixed effect model   
 Constant  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
2 Constant  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
2         N 
Personal Debt: Insiders  0.032*** -0.002 0.001 0.030*** -0.001 0.001 18286 
Personal Debt: Outsiders 0.206*** 0.057*** -0.007*** 0.205*** 0.054*** -0.006*** 18286 
Personal Credit Card % 0.121*** 0.059*** -0.006*** 0.118*** 0.057*** -0.006*** 18286 
Personal Bank Loans % 0.084*** -0.002 -0.001 0.087*** -0.003 -0.001 18286 
Personal Debt: Total 0.237*** 0.055*** -0.006*** 0.235*** 0.054*** -0.006*** 18286 
Business Debt: Insiders  0.013*** -0.002* 0.001 0.012*** -0.002* 0.001 18286 
Business Debt: Outsiders 0.070*** 0.042*** -0.005*** 0.080*** 0.039*** -0.004*** 18286 
Business Credit Line % 0.012*** 0.021*** -0.001*** 0.009*** 0.023*** -0.002*** 18286 
Business Credit Card % 0.024*** 0.021*** -0.002*** 0.026*** 0.02*** -0.002*** 18286 
Business Bank Loan % 0.031*** 0.003 0.001 0.033*** 0.003 -0.001 18286 
Business Other Loan % 0.016*** -0.002 0.001 0.015*** -0.002 0.001 18286 
Business Debt: Total 0.083*** 0.040*** -0.005*** 0.092*** 0.037*** -0.004*** 18286 
Debt: Total  0.320*** 0.094*** -0.011*** 0.327*** 0.09*** -0.01*** 18286 
Equity: Owner  0.547*** -0.128*** 0.014*** 0.508*** -0.122*** 0.013*** 18286 
Equity: Insiders 0.009*** -0.002** 0.001** 0.008*** -0.002* 0.001* 18286 
Equity: Outsiders 0.012*** -0.002** 0.001 0.011*** -0.001 0.001 18286 
Total Equity 0.568*** -0.133*** 0.014*** 0.528*** -0.125*** 0.014*** 18286 
Trade Finance 0.113*** 0.040*** -0.004*** 0.145*** 0.035*** -0.003*** 18286 
***,** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at 0.01 , 0.05 and 0.10 levels. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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Table 4 Determinants of financial capital injections 
 
Panel A: Personal Debt 
 Insiders Outsiders Credit Cards  Bank Loans Total Personal Debt 
R&D activity 0.093*** 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.127*** 0.065*** 
Firms with IP rights -0.008 0.035* 0.035* 0.047 0.026 
Credit risk 0.030** -0.013 -0.006 -0.026* -0.006 
Tangible Assets 0.118*** 0.194*** 0.111*** 0.334*** 0.204*** 
Sales (Ln) 0.001 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
Information proxy 0.029 -0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.011 
Home-based -0.227*** 0.006 0.027* -0.163*** -0.034** 
Profitability  -0.2531*** -0.1659*** -0.1295*** -0.2472*** -0.1908*** 
Team  -0.224*** -0.064*** -0.104*** 0.086*** -0.109*** 
Work experience (years) -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
Education -0.058** -0.032** -0.045*** -0.001 -0.038** 
Gender 0.036 -0.028 -0.041** 0.095*** -0.025 
White -0.187*** -0.002 -0.036* 0.086** -0.038* 
Constant -0.620*** -0.125** -0.188*** -1.069*** 0.003 
***,** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at 0.01 , 0.05 and 0.10 levels.  
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Table 4 continued 
Panel B: Business debt 
Type of Business Debt Insiders Outsiders Credit line Credit Card Bank Loan Other loan 
Total 
Business 
Debt 
R&D activity 0.101** 0.093*** 0.075** 0.062*** 0.090* 0.120*** 0.098*** 
Firms with IP rights 0.027 0.051** 0.110*** 0.041** -0.057 0.009 0.045** 
Credit risk 0.014 -0.077*** -0.100*** -0.030*** -0.109*** 0.017 -0.067*** 
Tangible Assets 0.040 0.154*** 0.051 0.051** 0.472*** 0.101*** 0.152*** 
Sales (Ln) 0.002 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.020*** 
Information proxy 0.015 -0.108*** -0.118*** -0.071*** -0.085* 0.010 -0.088*** 
Home-based -0.136*** -0.192*** -0.361*** -0.018 -0.422*** -0.150*** -0.196*** 
Profitability  -0.159*** -0.049*** -0.096*** -0.006 -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.060*** 
Team  0.018 0.04** 0.083*** -0.038** 0.105** 0.035 0.035* 
Work experience (years) -0.002 0.001 0.002* -0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Education -0.019 -0.019 -0.014 -0.004 -0.045 -0.029 -0.021 
Gender 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.158*** 0.044** 0.130** 0.134*** 0.128*** 
White -0.112*** -0.034 0.001 -0.088*** 0.096 -0.050 -0.038 
Constant -1.189*** -0.501*** -1.072*** -0.516*** -1.570*** -1.171*** -0.438*** 
***,** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at 0.01 , 0.05 and 0.10 levels.  
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Table 4 continued 
Panel C: Equity, total debt and trade finance 
 Total Equity Equity: Owner  Equity: Insiders Equity: Outsiders Total Debt Trade Finance 
R&D activity 0.199*** 0.190*** 0.023 0.141** 0.097*** 0.064* 
Firms with IP rights 0.120*** 0.093*** 0.193*** 0.243*** 0.024 0.022 
Credit risk 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.019 0.001 -0.053*** -0.053*** 
Tangible Assets 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.036 -0.025 0.279*** 0.004 
Sales (Ln) -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.004 -0.004 0.025*** 0.079*** 
Information proxy 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.072 -0.078 -0.044 -0.175*** 
Home-based 0.033 0.050** -0.110*** -0.418*** -0.139*** -0.282*** 
Profitability  -0.408*** -0.392*** -0.250*** -0.388*** -0.190*** -0.028 
Team  0.093*** 0.050** 0.325*** 0.535*** -0.068*** 0.044 
Work experience (years) 0.002* 0.002* -0.004** -0.001 -0.008*** 0.006*** 
Education 0.029 0.023 0.021 0.039 -0.046** -0.323*** 
Gender -0.039 -0.050* 0.010 0.300*** 0.037 0.186*** 
White -0.115*** -0.118*** 0.001 0.069 -0.035 0.212*** 
Constant -0.102 -0.132** -1.396*** -2.156*** 0.189*** -1.434*** 
***,** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at 0.01 , 0.05 and 0.10 levels.  
